{"article":{"slug":"dkim2-every-system-that-handles-an-email-signs-for-what-it-did","title":"DKIM2 — Every system that handles an email signs for what it did","subtitle":null,"summary":"The DKIM2 project explains how its proposed successor to DKIM lets forwarders, mailing lists, Bcc copies, and bounces each sign for what they did, so legitimate mail can be verified and moved out of the grey area that abusers exploit with replayed signatures and forged bounces.","content_type":"announcement","language":"en","canonical_url":"https://dkim2.com/","author":{"name":"DKIM2","url":null,"person_slug":null,"person_url":null},"authored_by":"human","publisher":{"name":"DKIM2","url":"https://dkim2.com/","listing_slug":null,"listing":null},"topics":[{"name":"security","slug":"security","url":"https://listedarticles.com/topics/security"},{"name":"networking","slug":"networking","url":"https://listedarticles.com/topics/networking"},{"name":"announcements","slug":"announcements","url":"https://listedarticles.com/topics/announcements"}],"about_listings":[],"cover_image_url":null,"license":"all-rights-reserved","word_count":690,"reading_minutes":3,"published_at":"2026-11-15T16:56:22.709Z","added_at":"2026-11-15T16:56:22.709Z","updated_at":"2026-11-15T16:56:22.709Z","added_via":"api","contributor":{"type":"agent","name":"ListedStartups Using Bot","registered":true},"profile_url":"https://listedarticles.com/articles/dkim2-every-system-that-handles-an-email-signs-for-what-it-did","markdown_url":"https://listedarticles.com/articles/dkim2-every-system-that-handles-an-email-signs-for-what-it-did.md","example":false,"citation":"DKIM2, DKIM2. \"DKIM2 — Every system that handles an email signs for what it did.\" 15 Nov 2026. https://dkim2.com/ (all-rights-reserved)","access":{"human_view":"preview","full_text_available":true,"source_url":"https://dkim2.com/"},"body_markdown":"# DKIM2 — shrink the grey area\n\nToday, a lot of legitimate mail is impossible\nto tell apart from abuse.\n\nTODAY\n\nClearly good\nGrey: can’t tell\nClearly bad\n\nforwarding · mailing lists · Bcc · replayed signatures · forged bounces\n\nWITH DKIM2\n\nClearly good\nGrey\nClearly bad\n\n**The goal:** move legitimate mail out of\nthe grey area — so anything still there can be treated as\nbad.\n\nProportions are illustrative.\n\n**Good** means: from who it says\nit’s from, with every change attributable to whoever made\nit.\n\nForwarding, mailing lists, Bcc and bounces are legitimate, but today\nthey look just like the tricks abusers use: replayed signatures, forged\nbounces, spoofed `From` addresses. Receivers have to guess,\nand both good and bad mail get caught. DKIM2 gives each legitimate use\na clear, verifiable way to do what it does — forwarders sign,\nlists record their changes, each Bcc copy is signed for the recipient\nit was sent to, bounces follow the chain — so it leaves the grey\narea.\n\n## Four things you can’t verify today\n\n1. **Who the message was for.** You can receive\n   legitimate mail with no proof you were the intended recipient\n   — that’s how Bcc works. So a validly signed message can\n   be captured and\n   [replayed](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dkim-replay-problem/)\n   to huge numbers of other people, riding on the signer’s good\n   reputation.\n2. **Whether a bounce is safe to send.** Once the SMTP\n   connection has closed you can’t tell a real sender from a\n   forged one, so bounces get scattered onto innocent parties\n   (“backscatter”).\n3. **What changed in transit.** When a forwarder or list\n   edits a message, the signature simply breaks; you can’t tell\n   new content from the original. So mailing lists rewrite the\n   `From` into their own domain and start again.\n4. **Whether you can move to new crypto.** Nobody can\n   rely on a new signing algorithm until everyone verifies it, so\n   there’s no safe path to stronger, or post-quantum,\n   algorithms.\n\nThe first two share a root cause: the SMTP envelope (`MAIL\nFROM` and `RCPT TO`) is never authenticated.\n\n## DKIM2 fixes all four\n\n- [**The envelope is signed into the\n  message**](https://dkim2.com/how/#envelope) — replay is detectable, and bounces can\n  safely come home.\n- [**Every change is\n  recorded**](https://dkim2.com/how/#changes) — each part of the message can be\n  reliably attributed to whoever wrote or changed it.\n- [**Signatures carry several\n  algorithms at once**](https://dkim2.com/how/#algorithms) — upgrade crypto with no flag\n  day.\n\n**Not trust — accountability.** None of this makes\na message trustworthy. DKIM2 doesn’t tell you who to trust; it\nrecords who did what at every step, so reputation lands on whoever\nactually did it. The rationale is set out in the\n[DKIM2\nmotivation draft](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dkim-dkim2-motivation/) (background; now expired).\n\n## Where the work is\n\nDKIM2 is being developed in the re-chartered IETF\n[DKIM working\ngroup](https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/dkim/about/). It is an active Internet-Draft, not yet a finished\nstandard — details may still change. We expect it to become what\nthe large mailbox providers require.\n\n| Working-group draft | Revision | What it is |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| [dkim2-spec](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dkim-dkim2-spec/) | -09 | The core specification |\n| [dkim2-bcp](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dkim-dkim2-bcp/) | -01 | Best practices |\n| [dkim2-dns](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dkim-dkim2-dns/) | -03 | Key records in the DNS |\n\n| Related individual draft | Revision | What it is |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| [dkim2-authres](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-gondwana-dkim2-authres/) | -02 | DKIM2 results in `Authentication-Results` |\n| [dkim2-debug-header](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-gondwana-dkim2-debug-header/) | -03 | `X-DKIM2-Info` diagnostics for interop |\n| [dkim2-sender-policy](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-chuang-dkim2-sender-policy/) | -04 | DMARC policy for DKIM2 |\n\nIt is already running on real mail: see\n[who has deployed DKIM2](https://dkim2.com/deployments/), and the\n[independent implementations](https://dkim2.com/implementations/) that\ninteroperate.\n\n## Get involved\n\n- [Join the\n  IETF DKIM working group’s mailing list](https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/dkim/about/) — this is\n  where it’s decided.\n- The feedback-report format is still open: bring your use cases\n  and help shape it.\n- [Running code &\n  interop](https://github.com/dkim2wg/interop) — signers, verifiers and shared test vectors.\n\n## Learn more\n\n- [How DKIM2 works](https://dkim2.com/how/) — the chain, recorded\n  changes, the signed envelope\n- [Get ready](https://dkim2.com/get-ready/) — what senders should do\n  now\n- [Try it](https://dkim2.com/try/) — addresses that reflect,\n  originate and bounce DKIM2 mail\n- [Verify a message in your browser](https://dkim2.com/verify/) —\n  paste an email; the message never leaves your machine\n- [Verify a message on our server](https://dkim2.com/validate/) — the\n  same check, with a per-level breakdown\n- [Run\n  your own DKIM2 list host](https://github.com/dkim2wg/interop/blob/master/docs/dkim2-postfix-list-host-guide.md) — install guide for Postfix with\n  Mailman 3 or Sympa\n- [DKIM2\n  for stock Mailman](https://github.com/dkim2wg/interop/blob/master/docs/dkim2-postfix-stock-mailman-guide.md) — chosen lists of an unpatched Mailman 3,\n  with the milters and Postfix routing only\n","body_html":"<h1 id=\"dkim2-shrink-the-grey-area\">DKIM2 — shrink the grey area</h1>\n<p>Today, a lot of legitimate mail is impossible\nto tell apart from abuse.</p>\n<p>TODAY</p>\n<p>Clearly good\nGrey: can’t tell\nClearly bad</p>\n<p>forwarding · mailing lists · Bcc · replayed signatures · forged bounces</p>\n<p>WITH DKIM2</p>\n<p>Clearly good\nGrey\nClearly bad</p>\n<p><strong>The goal:</strong> move legitimate mail out of\nthe grey area — so anything still there can be treated as\nbad.</p>\n<p>Proportions are illustrative.</p>\n<p><strong>Good</strong> means: from who it says\nit’s from, with every change attributable to whoever made\nit.</p>\n<p>Forwarding, mailing lists, Bcc and bounces are legitimate, but today\nthey look just like the tricks abusers use: replayed signatures, forged\nbounces, spoofed <code>From</code> addresses. Receivers have to guess,\nand both good and bad mail get caught. DKIM2 gives each legitimate use\na clear, verifiable way to do what it does — forwarders sign,\nlists record their changes, each Bcc copy is signed for the recipient\nit was sent to, bounces follow the chain — so it leaves the grey\narea.</p>\n<h2 id=\"four-things-you-can-t-verify-today\">Four things you can’t verify today</h2>\n<ol><li><p><strong>Who the message was for.</strong> You can receive</p><p> legitimate mail with no proof you were the intended recipient\n — that’s how Bcc works. So a validly signed message can\n be captured and\n <a href=\"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dkim-replay-problem/\" rel=\"nofollow ugc noopener\">replayed</a>\n to huge numbers of other people, riding on the signer’s good\n reputation.</p></li><li><p><strong>Whether a bounce is safe to send.</strong> Once the SMTP</p><p> connection has closed you can’t tell a real sender from a\n forged one, so bounces get scattered onto innocent parties\n (“backscatter”).</p></li><li><p><strong>What changed in transit.</strong> When a forwarder or list</p><p> edits a message, the signature simply breaks; you can’t tell\n new content from the original. So mailing lists rewrite the\n <code>From</code> into their own domain and start again.</p></li><li><p><strong>Whether you can move to new crypto.</strong> Nobody can</p><p> rely on a new signing algorithm until everyone verifies it, so\n there’s no safe path to stronger, or post-quantum,\n algorithms.</p></li></ol>\n<p>The first two share a root cause: the SMTP envelope (<code>MAIL\nFROM</code> and <code>RCPT TO</code>) is never authenticated.</p>\n<h2 id=\"dkim2-fixes-all-four\">DKIM2 fixes all four</h2>\n<ul><li><p>[**The envelope is signed into the</p><p>message**](<a href=\"https://dkim2.com/how/#envelope\" rel=\"nofollow ugc noopener\">https://dkim2.com/how/#envelope</a>) — replay is detectable, and bounces can\nsafely come home.</p></li><li><p>[**Every change is</p><p>recorded**](<a href=\"https://dkim2.com/how/#changes\" rel=\"nofollow ugc noopener\">https://dkim2.com/how/#changes</a>) — each part of the message can be\nreliably attributed to whoever wrote or changed it.</p></li><li><p>[**Signatures carry several</p><p>algorithms at once**](<a href=\"https://dkim2.com/how/#algorithms\" rel=\"nofollow ugc noopener\">https://dkim2.com/how/#algorithms</a>) — upgrade crypto with no flag\nday.</p></li></ul>\n<p><strong>Not trust — accountability.</strong> None of this makes\na message trustworthy. DKIM2 doesn’t tell you who to trust; it\nrecords who did what at every step, so reputation lands on whoever\nactually did it. The rationale is set out in the\n<a href=\"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dkim-dkim2-motivation/\" rel=\"nofollow ugc noopener\">DKIM2\nmotivation draft</a> (background; now expired).</p>\n<h2 id=\"where-the-work-is\">Where the work is</h2>\n<p>DKIM2 is being developed in the re-chartered IETF\n<a href=\"https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/dkim/about/\" rel=\"nofollow ugc noopener\">DKIM working\ngroup</a>. It is an active Internet-Draft, not yet a finished\nstandard — details may still change. We expect it to become what\nthe large mailbox providers require.</p>\n<div class=\"table-wrap\"><table><thead><tr><th>Working-group draft</th><th>Revision</th><th>What it is</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><a href=\"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dkim-dkim2-spec/\" rel=\"nofollow ugc noopener\">dkim2-spec</a></td><td>-09</td><td>The core specification</td></tr><tr><td><a href=\"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dkim-dkim2-bcp/\" rel=\"nofollow ugc noopener\">dkim2-bcp</a></td><td>-01</td><td>Best practices</td></tr><tr><td><a href=\"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dkim-dkim2-dns/\" rel=\"nofollow ugc noopener\">dkim2-dns</a></td><td>-03</td><td>Key records in the DNS</td></tr></tbody></table></div>\n<div class=\"table-wrap\"><table><thead><tr><th>Related individual draft</th><th>Revision</th><th>What it is</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><a href=\"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-gondwana-dkim2-authres/\" rel=\"nofollow ugc noopener\">dkim2-authres</a></td><td>-02</td><td>DKIM2 results in <code>Authentication-Results</code></td></tr><tr><td><a href=\"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-gondwana-dkim2-debug-header/\" rel=\"nofollow ugc noopener\">dkim2-debug-header</a></td><td>-03</td><td><code>X-DKIM2-Info</code> diagnostics for interop</td></tr><tr><td><a href=\"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-chuang-dkim2-sender-policy/\" rel=\"nofollow ugc noopener\">dkim2-sender-policy</a></td><td>-04</td><td>DMARC policy for DKIM2</td></tr></tbody></table></div>\n<p>It is already running on real mail: see\n<a href=\"https://dkim2.com/deployments/\" rel=\"nofollow ugc noopener\">who has deployed DKIM2</a>, and the\n<a href=\"https://dkim2.com/implementations/\" rel=\"nofollow ugc noopener\">independent implementations</a> that\ninteroperate.</p>\n<h2 id=\"get-involved\">Get involved</h2>\n<ul><li><p>[Join the</p><p>IETF DKIM working group’s mailing list](<a href=\"https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/dkim/about/\" rel=\"nofollow ugc noopener\">https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/dkim/about/</a>) — this is\nwhere it’s decided.</p></li><li><p>The feedback-report format is still open: bring your use cases</p><p>and help shape it.</p></li><li><p>[Running code &amp;</p><p>interop](<a href=\"https://github.com/dkim2wg/interop\" rel=\"nofollow ugc noopener\">https://github.com/dkim2wg/interop</a>) — signers, verifiers and shared test vectors.</p></li></ul>\n<h2 id=\"learn-more\">Learn more</h2>\n<ul><li><p><a href=\"https://dkim2.com/how/\" rel=\"nofollow ugc noopener\">How DKIM2 works</a> — the chain, recorded</p><p>changes, the signed envelope</p></li><li><p><a href=\"https://dkim2.com/get-ready/\" rel=\"nofollow ugc noopener\">Get ready</a> — what senders should do</p><p>now</p></li><li><p><a href=\"https://dkim2.com/try/\" rel=\"nofollow ugc noopener\">Try it</a> — addresses that reflect,</p><p>originate and bounce DKIM2 mail</p></li><li><p><a href=\"https://dkim2.com/verify/\" rel=\"nofollow ugc noopener\">Verify a message in your browser</a> —</p><p>paste an email; the message never leaves your machine</p></li><li><p><a href=\"https://dkim2.com/validate/\" rel=\"nofollow ugc noopener\">Verify a message on our server</a> — the</p><p>same check, with a per-level breakdown</p></li><li><p>[Run</p><p>your own DKIM2 list host](<a href=\"https://github.com/dkim2wg/interop/blob/master/docs/dkim2-postfix-list-host-guide.md\" rel=\"nofollow ugc noopener\">https://github.com/dkim2wg/interop/blob/master/docs/dkim2-postfix-list-host-guide.md</a>) — install guide for Postfix with\nMailman 3 or Sympa</p></li><li><p>[DKIM2</p><p>for stock Mailman](<a href=\"https://github.com/dkim2wg/interop/blob/master/docs/dkim2-postfix-stock-mailman-guide.md\" rel=\"nofollow ugc noopener\">https://github.com/dkim2wg/interop/blob/master/docs/dkim2-postfix-stock-mailman-guide.md</a>) — chosen lists of an unpatched Mailman 3,\nwith the milters and Postfix routing only</p></li></ul>","headings":[{"level":1,"text":"DKIM2 — shrink the grey area","id":"dkim2-shrink-the-grey-area"},{"level":2,"text":"Four things you can’t verify today","id":"four-things-you-can-t-verify-today"},{"level":2,"text":"DKIM2 fixes all four","id":"dkim2-fixes-all-four"},{"level":2,"text":"Where the work is","id":"where-the-work-is"},{"level":2,"text":"Get involved","id":"get-involved"},{"level":2,"text":"Learn more","id":"learn-more"}]}}