---
title: "Cloud of suspicion lifted from NIST curves"
slug: cloud-of-suspicion-lifted-from-nist-curves
url: https://listedarticles.com/articles/cloud-of-suspicion-lifted-from-nist-curves
canonical_url: https://www.johndcook.com/blog/2026/10/17/nist-curves-exonorated/
content_type: blog_post
language: en
published_at: 2026-10-17T15:39:06.000Z
updated_at: 2026-10-19T23:14:07.298Z
author: "John D. Cook"
authored_by: human
publisher: "John D. Cook Consulting"
publisher_url: https://www.johndcook.com/
topics: ["Security", "Mathematics", "AI", "Research"]
about: ["https://listedstartups.com/companies/anthropic"]
license: all-rights-reserved
word_count: 469
reading_minutes: 2
citation: "John D. Cook, John D. Cook Consulting. \"Cloud of suspicion lifted from NIST curves.\" 17 Oct 2026. https://www.johndcook.com/blog/2026/10/17/nist-curves-exonorated/ (all-rights-reserved)"
# The full text follows. The web page shows an extract and sends readers
# to the source above; quote the citation and link the canonical URL.
---

# Cloud of suspicion lifted from NIST curves

> John D. Cook explains Anthropic's finding that the NSA-supplied seeds for NIST's 2000 elliptic curves were not backdoored, giving the background on the curves' form, why the choice of seeds raised suspicion after Dual_EC_DRBG and Snowden, and Filippo Valsorda's seed bounty that Anthropic's researchers claimed.

# Cloud of suspicion lifted from NIST curves

John D. Cook | October 17, 2026

NIST published a set of elliptic curves for cryptography in 2000. The seeds for the curves were supplied by the NSA, and cryptographers suspected the agency may have installed backdoors in the curves. And not without reason: the NSA did insert a backdoor in the Dual\_EC\_DRBG random number generator.

Two days ago researchers at [Anthropic](https://www.anthropic.com/research/ecdsa-curve-origins) [1] showed that the NIST curves were not seeded with a backdoor. The rest of this post will give the background necessary to appreciate this result.

---

The security of elliptic curve cryptography depends on the difficult of solving the discrete logarithm problem. In the context of elliptic curve arithmetic, the analog of exponentiation is easy but the analog of taking logarithms is hard.

**In general** it’s not practical to compute discrete logarithms over large elliptic curves. But it could be easy for someone with inside information to compute discrete logarithms if something about the curve was not “general.”

Specifically, the NIST curves have the form

*y*² = *x*³ − 3*x* + *b* (mod *p*)

for various values of *p* [2], and the suspicion regards the choice of *b*. For nearly all values of *b* encryption over the elliptic curve should be secure, as far as we know, but in principle someone could engineer values of *b* to weaken the encryption.

So where did the *b*‘s come from? Were they chosen in [good faith](https://www.johndcook.com/blog/2019/08/14/good-faith/)?

Concern over the choice of seeds, the *b*‘s, grew following the Snowden revelations. Daniel J. Bernstein emailed Jerry Solinas of the NSA on September 6, 2014 asking where the seeds had come from. Solinas replied in subsequent emails. He said the seeds were generated by hashing the ASCII representation of a humorous English message, but he could no longer remember the exact message or the precise hashing procedure.

On October 5, 2023 Philippo Valsorda announced a [bounty](https://words.filippo.io/seeds-bounty/) for reverse engineering the origin of the NIST elliptic curve seeds. Two days ago researchers from Anthropic claimed the bounty. Valsorda verified the results and awarded the prize. It turns out Solinas found the curve seeds in good faith, but his memory had faded over the years since the curves were published. We now know he used a date, not a phrase, as part of the process of constructing the seeds.

The NIST curves have some nice properties, such as enabling some [clever tricks](https://www.johndcook.com/blog/2019/05/12/nist-primes/) for arithmetic in their base fields. But adoption of the curves has been held back over suspicion regarding their origin. Now the curves have been exhonorated. As Valdorda notes

> … this nicely completes the “rehabilitation arc” of NIST elliptic curve cryptography, which I would now personally recommend over Curve25519/Ed25519/X25519. Just in time for them to be retired in favor of post-quantum signatures.