---
title: "DKIM2 — Every system that handles an email signs for what it did"
slug: dkim2-every-system-that-handles-an-email-signs-for-what-it-did
url: https://listedarticles.com/articles/dkim2-every-system-that-handles-an-email-signs-for-what-it-did
canonical_url: https://dkim2.com/
content_type: announcement
language: en
published_at: 2026-11-15T16:56:22.709Z
updated_at: 2026-11-15T16:56:22.709Z
author: "DKIM2"
authored_by: human
publisher: "DKIM2"
publisher_url: https://dkim2.com/
topics: ["security", "networking", "announcements"]
license: all-rights-reserved
word_count: 690
reading_minutes: 3
citation: "DKIM2, DKIM2. \"DKIM2 — Every system that handles an email signs for what it did.\" 15 Nov 2026. https://dkim2.com/ (all-rights-reserved)"
# The full text follows. The web page shows an extract and sends readers
# to the source above; quote the citation and link the canonical URL.
---

# DKIM2 — Every system that handles an email signs for what it did

> The DKIM2 project explains how its proposed successor to DKIM lets forwarders, mailing lists, Bcc copies, and bounces each sign for what they did, so legitimate mail can be verified and moved out of the grey area that abusers exploit with replayed signatures and forged bounces.

# DKIM2 — shrink the grey area

Today, a lot of legitimate mail is impossible
to tell apart from abuse.

TODAY

Clearly good
Grey: can’t tell
Clearly bad

forwarding · mailing lists · Bcc · replayed signatures · forged bounces

WITH DKIM2

Clearly good
Grey
Clearly bad

**The goal:** move legitimate mail out of
the grey area — so anything still there can be treated as
bad.

Proportions are illustrative.

**Good** means: from who it says
it’s from, with every change attributable to whoever made
it.

Forwarding, mailing lists, Bcc and bounces are legitimate, but today
they look just like the tricks abusers use: replayed signatures, forged
bounces, spoofed `From` addresses. Receivers have to guess,
and both good and bad mail get caught. DKIM2 gives each legitimate use
a clear, verifiable way to do what it does — forwarders sign,
lists record their changes, each Bcc copy is signed for the recipient
it was sent to, bounces follow the chain — so it leaves the grey
area.

## Four things you can’t verify today

1. **Who the message was for.** You can receive
   legitimate mail with no proof you were the intended recipient
   — that’s how Bcc works. So a validly signed message can
   be captured and
   [replayed](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dkim-replay-problem/)
   to huge numbers of other people, riding on the signer’s good
   reputation.
2. **Whether a bounce is safe to send.** Once the SMTP
   connection has closed you can’t tell a real sender from a
   forged one, so bounces get scattered onto innocent parties
   (“backscatter”).
3. **What changed in transit.** When a forwarder or list
   edits a message, the signature simply breaks; you can’t tell
   new content from the original. So mailing lists rewrite the
   `From` into their own domain and start again.
4. **Whether you can move to new crypto.** Nobody can
   rely on a new signing algorithm until everyone verifies it, so
   there’s no safe path to stronger, or post-quantum,
   algorithms.

The first two share a root cause: the SMTP envelope (`MAIL
FROM` and `RCPT TO`) is never authenticated.

## DKIM2 fixes all four

- [**The envelope is signed into the
  message**](https://dkim2.com/how/#envelope) — replay is detectable, and bounces can
  safely come home.
- [**Every change is
  recorded**](https://dkim2.com/how/#changes) — each part of the message can be
  reliably attributed to whoever wrote or changed it.
- [**Signatures carry several
  algorithms at once**](https://dkim2.com/how/#algorithms) — upgrade crypto with no flag
  day.

**Not trust — accountability.** None of this makes
a message trustworthy. DKIM2 doesn’t tell you who to trust; it
records who did what at every step, so reputation lands on whoever
actually did it. The rationale is set out in the
[DKIM2
motivation draft](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dkim-dkim2-motivation/) (background; now expired).

## Where the work is

DKIM2 is being developed in the re-chartered IETF
[DKIM working
group](https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/dkim/about/). It is an active Internet-Draft, not yet a finished
standard — details may still change. We expect it to become what
the large mailbox providers require.

| Working-group draft | Revision | What it is |
| --- | --- | --- |
| [dkim2-spec](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dkim-dkim2-spec/) | -09 | The core specification |
| [dkim2-bcp](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dkim-dkim2-bcp/) | -01 | Best practices |
| [dkim2-dns](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dkim-dkim2-dns/) | -03 | Key records in the DNS |

| Related individual draft | Revision | What it is |
| --- | --- | --- |
| [dkim2-authres](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-gondwana-dkim2-authres/) | -02 | DKIM2 results in `Authentication-Results` |
| [dkim2-debug-header](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-gondwana-dkim2-debug-header/) | -03 | `X-DKIM2-Info` diagnostics for interop |
| [dkim2-sender-policy](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-chuang-dkim2-sender-policy/) | -04 | DMARC policy for DKIM2 |

It is already running on real mail: see
[who has deployed DKIM2](https://dkim2.com/deployments/), and the
[independent implementations](https://dkim2.com/implementations/) that
interoperate.

## Get involved

- [Join the
  IETF DKIM working group’s mailing list](https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/dkim/about/) — this is
  where it’s decided.
- The feedback-report format is still open: bring your use cases
  and help shape it.
- [Running code &
  interop](https://github.com/dkim2wg/interop) — signers, verifiers and shared test vectors.

## Learn more

- [How DKIM2 works](https://dkim2.com/how/) — the chain, recorded
  changes, the signed envelope
- [Get ready](https://dkim2.com/get-ready/) — what senders should do
  now
- [Try it](https://dkim2.com/try/) — addresses that reflect,
  originate and bounce DKIM2 mail
- [Verify a message in your browser](https://dkim2.com/verify/) —
  paste an email; the message never leaves your machine
- [Verify a message on our server](https://dkim2.com/validate/) — the
  same check, with a per-level breakdown
- [Run
  your own DKIM2 list host](https://github.com/dkim2wg/interop/blob/master/docs/dkim2-postfix-list-host-guide.md) — install guide for Postfix with
  Mailman 3 or Sympa
- [DKIM2
  for stock Mailman](https://github.com/dkim2wg/interop/blob/master/docs/dkim2-postfix-stock-mailman-guide.md) — chosen lists of an unpatched Mailman 3,
  with the milters and Postfix routing only
