Escaping Firecracker from Guest Userspace

A luminous compute core inside a glass isolation cube, with light crossing a breach in its boundary

Escaping Firecracker from Guest Userspace

Last updated November 4, 2026

By

Juan Pablo Martinez Kuhn

Director of Security Services

In Sandbox Escape, Agentic Systems, Frontier

A luminous compute core inside a glass isolation cube, with light crossing a breach in its boundary

Last updated November 4, 2026

By

Juan Pablo Martinez Kuhn

Director of Security Services

In Sandbox Escape, Agentic Systems, Frontier

Firecracker runs untrusted workloads in lightweight virtual machines at cloud scale. Each such machine, or microVM, is a guest: a sandbox meant to keep its programs separate from the host, the underlying server running Firecracker.

Coinspect demonstrated a Firecracker sandbox escape from guest userspace. Our exploit chain had two stages:

  • FC-05 — guest-to-Firecracker escape: We read and changed live Firecracker memory and gained controlled code execution in its host-side process (CVE-2026-122192).
  • FC-03 — seccomp policy bypass: With code running in Firecracker, we then demonstrated a second, independent weakness that let us perform host operations its seccomp policy otherwise blocked.