---
title: "Hijacking Samsung TV Smart Hub Ads"
slug: hijacking-samsung-tv-smart-hub-ads
url: https://listedarticles.com/articles/hijacking-samsung-tv-smart-hub-ads
canonical_url: https://dvratil.cz/2026/11/hijacking-samsung-tv-smart-hub-ads/
content_type: blog_post
language: en
published_at: 2026-11-12T07:00:00.000Z
updated_at: 2026-11-13T08:09:45.165Z
author: "Daniel Vrátil"
authored_by: human
publisher: "Daniel Vrátil's blog"
publisher_url: https://dvratil.cz/
topics: ["security", "privacy", "networking", "hardware"]
license: all-rights-reserved
word_count: 869
reading_minutes: 4
citation: "Daniel Vrátil, Daniel Vrátil's blog. \"Hijacking Samsung TV Smart Hub Ads.\" 12 Nov 2026. https://dvratil.cz/2026/11/hijacking-samsung-tv-smart-hub-ads/ (all-rights-reserved)"
# The full text follows. The web page shows an extract and sends readers
# to the source above; quote the citation and link the canonical URL.
---

# Hijacking Samsung TV Smart Hub Ads

> Daniel Vrátil uses mitmproxy, a MikroTik router setup, and the leaked eMudhra CA private key that his Samsung TV still trusts to intercept the Smart Hub's TLS ad requests and serve his own spoofed responses, replacing Samsung's ads; he open-sources the samsung-tv-adspoofer tool.

# Hijacking Samsung TV Smart Hub Ads

I have a Samsung smart TV from 2022. At some point, the Smart Hub started
displaying ads. I think it’s absolutely disgusting that a device that I paid
for and own, and that doesn’t use any additional Samsung “free” services is
forcing ads on me, just to generate additional revenue for Samsung from an
already-sold device. I was blocking the ads via my [Pi-hole](http://pi-hole.net)
instance, until I was tinkering with my homelab and networking setup not
that long ago and broke something. That caused the ads to start appearing
again, which reminded me of their existence.

Around the same time, the [eMudhra CA certificate fiasco](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EMudhra#2026_weak_key_incident)
took place, and the “compromised” private key was added to
[*mitmproxy*](https://mitmproxy.org). *mitmproxy* is an open-source project for inspecting,
replaying and modifying HTTP(S) network traffic. Normally, in order for it to
be able to intercept TLS-encrypted traffic, the “victim” device must trust a
custom certificate created by *mitmproxy* - this way *mitmproxy* can decrypt
the traffic, inspect it, and then re-encrypt it using a real certificate before
forwarding it to the intended destination. Unfortunately, some devices don’t
allow adding custom SSL certificates to their truststore - like my Samsung TV.

Intercepting TV traffic with mitmproxy

**Mikrotik configuration (adapt to your router as needed)**

```
# 192.168.0.7 is my raspberry-pi with mitmproxy
# 192.168.0.9 is my Samsung TV

/routing/table
add name=tv-proxy fib

/ip/route
add dst-address=0.0.0.0/0 gateway=192.168.0.7 routing-table=tv-proxy

/routing/rule
add src-address=192.168.0.9/32 action=lookup-only-in-table table=tv-proxy

/ip/firewall/filter
add chain=forward action=accept src-address=192.168.0.9 connection-state=established,related
add chain=forward action=accept dst-address=192.168.0.9 connection-state=established,related
```

**Raspberry-Pi configuration**

```
sudo iptables -I FORWARD 1 -s 192.168.0.9 -j ACCEPT
sudo iptables -I FORWARD 1 -d 192.168.0.9 -m conntrack --ctstate ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT
sudo iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -i eth0 -s 192.168.0.9 -p tcp --dport 80 -j REDIRECT --to-port 8080
sudo iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -i eth0 -s 192.168.0.9 -p tcp --dport 443 -j REDIRECT --to-port 8080
sudo iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -s 192.168.0.9/32 -o eth0 -j MASQUERADE
```

**mitmproxy configuration**

```
uvx --from mitmproxy mitmweb --web-port 8083 -p 8081 --emudhra --ssl-insecure --mode transparent --set stream_large_bodies=1m
```

With the *eMudhra* certificate being exposed, anyone can now create a custom
SSL certificate for an arbitrary domain (let’s say a Samsung ad network
domain), sign it with the compromised CA certificate, and all devices that have
the *eMudhra* CA certificate in their truststores will trust the custom SSL
certificate. This is why software vendors were racing (some more, some less) to
revoke the certificate from their truststores, so that browsers, computers and
smart phones wouldn’t be susceptible to this kind of attack. Luckily for me,
Samsung did not yet release an update for my TV that would revoke the
certificate. This allowed me to route all traffic from the TV through
*mitmproxy* and get a list of all the domains and endpoints that my TV talks
to, but also see the structure of the requests and response payloads.

Turns out the flow is pretty simple: when something interesting happens on the
TV, the TV sends a request to `https://catalyst.adgrx.com/adopportunity` with
some details about the TV. When you return to the Smart Hub, the “home screen”
of the TV, so to speak, the TV sends requests to
`https://tvx.adgrx.com/impressions/tile` again with some details about the TV,
and in response it receives either an empty JSON object (`{}`) or a JSON
response describing an ad to display at the top of the Smart Hub.

So I wrote a simple server in Rust that handles the same `/impressions/tile`
endpoint and always returns JSON with an ad, except instead of links to an
actual ad image, it has a link to a random photo of my family. I also included
a simple frontend where I can manage the images that should be served.

![AdSpoofer frontend](https://dvratil.cz/2026/11/hijacking-samsung-tv-smart-hub-ads/images/frontend.png)

Additionally, the server blackholes any other `*.adgrx.com` request and returns
`204 No Content` to prevent all the tracking from getting out of my home
network.

I then generated a wildcard SSL certificate for `*.adgrx.com`, signed it with
the compromised eMudhra CA certificate and added it to the app.

Finally, I configured my router to resolve `*.adgrx.com` to the IP address of
my NAS, where I am running the ad spoofer, and now when we launch the TV, it
looks like this:

![Photo of my TV showing a spoofed ad with a custom picture](https://dvratil.cz/2026/11/hijacking-samsung-tv-smart-hub-ads/images/tv-photo.jpg)

The source code for the adspoofer [is on my GitHub](https://github.com/danvratil/samsung-tv-adspoofer) in case
anyone wants to try it out. It works with my particular model of TV, but other
Samsung TVs might use different endpoints or expect a different shape of the
response. If you make it work with your TV, feel free to send a patch!

Obviously, this will only work as long as my TV trusts the compromised eMudhra
certificates, which is either until the certificate expires or until Samsung
pushes out an update, revoking the certificate. The latter I can prevent by
blocking updates to the TV (which carries its own set of risks), but about that
another time.

---

*Originally published on [Daniel Vrátil's blog](https://dvratil.cz/2026/11/hijacking-samsung-tv-smart-hub-ads/) on November 12, 2026. Licensed CC BY-SA 4.0.*
