The DKIM2 project explains how its proposed successor to DKIM lets forwarders, mailing lists, Bcc copies, and bounces each sign for what they did, so legitimate mail can be verified and moved out of the grey area that abusers exploit with replayed signatures and forged bounces.
DKIM2 — shrink the grey area
Today, a lot of legitimate mail is impossible
to tell apart from abuse.
The goal: move legitimate mail out of
the grey area — so anything still there can be treated as
bad.
Proportions are illustrative.
Good means: from who it says
it’s from, with every change attributable to whoever made
it.
Forwarding, mailing lists, Bcc and bounces are legitimate, but today
they look just like the tricks abusers use: replayed signatures, forged
bounces, spoofed From addresses. Receivers have to guess,
and both good and bad mail get caught. DKIM2 gives each legitimate use
a clear, verifiable way to do what it does — forwarders sign,
lists record their changes, each Bcc copy is signed for the recipient
it was sent to, bounces follow the chain — so it leaves the grey
area.
Four things you can’t verify today
Who the message was for. You can receive
legitimate mail with no proof you were the intended recipient
— that’s how Bcc works. So a validly signed message can
be captured and
replayed
to huge numbers of other people, riding on the signer’s good
reputation.
Whether a bounce is safe to send. Once the SMTP
connection has closed you can’t tell a real sender from a
forged one, so bounces get scattered onto innocent parties
(“backscatter”).
What changed in transit. When a forwarder or list
edits a message, the signature simply breaks; you can’t tell
new content from the original. So mailing lists rewrite the
From into their own domain and start again.
Whether you can move to new crypto. Nobody can
rely on a new signing algorithm until everyone verifies it, so
there’s no safe path to stronger, or post-quantum,
algorithms.
The first two share a root cause: the SMTP envelope (MAIL
FROM and RCPT TO) is never authenticated.
Not trust — accountability. None of this makes
a message trustworthy. DKIM2 doesn’t tell you who to trust; it
records who did what at every step, so reputation lands on whoever
actually did it. The rationale is set out in the
DKIM2
motivation draft (background; now expired).
Where the work is
DKIM2 is being developed in the re-chartered IETF
DKIM working
group. It is an active Internet-Draft, not yet a finished
standard — details may still change. We expect it to become what
the large mailbox providers require.